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Abstract 
By acting as a trader, a State may influence the direction of international trade through its purchases 
and sales decisions without resort to other more direct means of intervention such as the application of 
tariffs and quotas. The GATT recognizes that States may choose to participate in international 
commerce in competition with private firms, but it does not leave them with a free hand when it comes 
to carrying out their trading activities. The core rules regulating a State's trading operations are found 
in Article XVII and related provisions of the GATT 1994. In the 70 years since their adoption, 
developments in both the GATT 1947 and the WTO have uncovered a set of seldom employed and 
relatively shallow disciplines rooted in the principle of non-discrimination, raising doubts about their 
relevance to the kinds "State trading" activities undertaken today. It remains true, however, that while 
State trading enterprises continue to operate across the world, and fundamental questions about the full 
reach and scope of the existing rules endure, it cannot be excluded that the limits of Article XVII and 
related provisions of the GATT 1994 may well be explored in the future practice of WTO Members, 
thereby clarifying their regulatory function in the modern trading system. 
Keywords 
STEs, SOEs, Article XVII, China 
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1. Introduction* 
One of the fundamental objectives of the GATT is to liberalize international trade by reducing the 
degree of government interference in the trading decisions of private enterprise. Because it is generally 
presumed that governments, as opposed to private traders, will not always be motivated to achieve the 
most efficient allocation of resources, the GATT introduces a series of limits and disciplines on the 
ability of governments to influence trading markets, anticipating that this will improve aggregate 
economic welfare both within nations and across international boundaries.
1
 The principal focus of 
these rules is the regulation of "traditional" trade policy instruments such as tariffs and quotas, internal 
taxation and the use of contingent trade protection. However, the GATT also addresses other less 
obvious ways in which a government may distort the movement of goods across borders, including 
through State trading. 
By acting as a trader, a State may influence the direction of international trade through its purchase 
and sales decisions without resort to other more direct means of trade regulation. The GATT 
recognizes that States may choose to participate in international commerce in competition with private 
firms, but it does not leave them with a free hand in how to carry out their trading operations. Several 
provisions of the GATT specifically regulate the extent to which a State may participate in the market 
as a trader, with the core rules set out in Article XVII (State trading), Article II:4 (mark-ups applied by 
import monopolies) and the Interpretative Notes Ad Articles XI-XIV and XVIII (restrictions made 
effective through State trading operations).
2
 This paper briefly outlines the origins of these provisions 
and provides an overview of how their main elements have thus far been interpreted and applied 
within the context of the GATT and the WTO.  
2. Overview of the negotiating history 
The origin of Article XVII and related provisions of the GATT 1994 can be traced back to the very 
genesis of the GATT in the United States' 1945 Proposals for the Expansion of World Trade and 
Employment.
3
 In this first set of proposals for how to shape the post-War international trading order, 
the United States promoted the idea that world trade could be expanded for the benefit of all 
participating nations by tackling what were then perceived to be four major problems: (i) restrictions 
imposed by governments; (ii) restrictions imposed by private combines or cartels; (iii) fear of disorder 
in the markets for certain primary commodities; and (iv) irregularity, and the fear of irregularity, in 
production and employment.
4
 The United States' proposals described a series of rules and principles 
                                                     
*
 A longer version of this paper was presented during the 2016 Columbia Law School Trade Seminar Series on State-
Owned Enterprises in China: Trade and Competition Issues. Any views expressed are solely attributable to the author and 
not the WTO Secretariat. 
1
 Jackson, J.H., Davey, W.J., Sykes, A.O., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and 
Text, 6th Edition, 2013, pp. 22-30 and 228; Jackson, J.H., World Trade and the Law of the GATT, 1969, pp. 329-330. 
2
 Articles XX(d) and XXXVII of the GATT also deal with State trading. Article XX(d) prescribes that nothing in the 
GATT shall prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures necessary to ensure compliance with laws 
or regulations relating to inter alia the enforcement of monopolies operated under Articles II:4 and XVII. 
Article XXXVII:3(a), which is part of Part IV of the GATT and deals with "Commitments", states that developed country 
Members shall make every effort, in cases where a government determines the resale price of products wholly or mainly 
produced in the territories of developing country Members, to maintain trade margins at equitable levels. Neither of these 
provisions is specifically examined in this paper. 
3
 Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment, Developed by a Technical Staff within the Government of the 
United States in Preparation for an International Conference on Trade and Employment and Presented for Consideration 
by the Peoples of the World, U.S. Department of State, November 1945 ("United States 1945 Proposals"). 
4
 United States 1945 Proposals, p. 2. 
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intended to serve as the starting point for multilateral discussions on how each of these issues might be 
addressed.
5
 
Within the United States' proposals, the potentially distortive impact of State trading was perceived 
to be one of the species of governmental barriers to trade needing to be addressed. The main concern 
with State trading at the time was that purchases and sales decisions (of particularly State trading 
monopolies) could be taken in such a way as to cause serious obstacles to international trade by, for 
example, discriminating between countries, raising the resale price of imports or artificially restricting 
the amount of imported or exported products. State trading enterprises could, therefore, be potentially 
operated to undermine the trade benefits of disciplines limiting the use of other more transparent trade 
policy instruments such as tariffs and quotas.  
The United States' initial proposals sought to address these concerns by coupling a general 
"equality of treatment" obligation calling for countries involved in State trading to ensure that their 
"foreign purchases and sales" are "influenced solely by commercial considerations", with two more 
specific obligations intended to secure a minimum level of market access from countries operating 
"monopolies of individual products" or "complete monopolies of foreign trade".
6
  
A more elaborated version of these proposals was presented less than one year later in the United 
States Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization.
7
 The United States' Suggested 
Charter became the main focus of the International Conference on Trade and Employment convened 
by the United Nations in February 1946,
8
 which within two years would produce both the GATT 1947 
and the 1948 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization.
9
 Not unlike the United States' 
1945 Proposals, the Suggested Charter sought to regulate State trading by introducing a general rule of 
equality of treatment, this time presented as a principle of "non-discrimination" (Article 26), along 
with two provisions dealing with "State monopolies of individual products" (Article 27) and "complete 
State monopolies of import trade" (Article 28).  
Article 26 of the Suggested Charter sought to ensure that the trading operations of covered 
enterprises approximated those of private traders by requiring that the purchases and sales activities of 
State trading enterprises ("STEs") be undertaken on a non-discriminatory basis, solely in accordance 
with commercial considerations. The United States explained that this obligation was intended to 
operate as "the counterpart of the most-favoured-nation clause as applied to … customs duties".10 
Under the terms of Article 27, countries operating import monopolies were called upon to negotiate 
the mark-up applied on domestic sales of the imported product. For the United States, this obligation 
would ensure that mark-ups were negotiated "in the same way as tariffs",
11
 thereby safeguarding a 
minimum level of market access that might otherwise be undermined or not afforded at all were 
countries' import monopoly operations left unregulated. Finally, the United States explained that the 
rationale underlying Article 28, which required any country operating a "complete or substantially 
complete monopoly of its import trade" to negotiate minimum purchase agreements, was to 
                                                     
5
 Letter from William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State, to the United States Secretary of State, 1 November 1945, 
United States 1945 Proposals, p. IV. 
6
 United States 1945 Proposals, Section E, State Trading, p17. 
7
 Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization of the United Nations, U.S. Department of State, September 
1946 ("United States Suggested Charter"). 
8
 Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, 
EPCT/33, p. 3.  
9
 For a succinct account of how the GATT developed in tandem with the Havana Charter for an International Trade 
Organization, see Jackson, Davey and Sykes, ibid., pp. 230-233.  
10
 Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on Trade and Employment, Verbatim Report of the Fifth Meeting 
of Committee II, London, 30 October 1946, EPCT/CII/PV5, ("London Preparatory Committee, EPCT/CII/PV5") p. 36. 
11
 London Preparatory Committee, EPCT/CII/PV5, pp. 36-37. 
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approximate the "general effect of reductions in duties and other trade barriers by countries whose 
trade is handled largely or mainly by private enterprise" – "in other words, … allow imports to supply 
a larger share of the home market".
12
 
The disciplines that are today applied to STEs through the operation of Article XVII and related 
provisions of the GATT 1994 reflect an effort to pursue the first two of these three objectives. The 
proposed rule that would have required countries operating complete or substantially completely 
monopolies of their import trade to undertake global purchase agreements was abandoned, having 
never been discussed in any substance by the GATT and Havana Charter negotiators.
13
 No 
replacement provision has ever been adopted. 
3. Content and coverage of the main Disciplines 
3.1 Non-discrimination 
Using much the same language found in the United States' original proposals, the principle that State 
trading is to be undertaken on a non-discriminatory basis is given effect in the GATT 1994 through 
Article XVII:1, which is divided into three sub-paragraphs and reads as follows: 
1.* (a) Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State enterprise, 
wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or special 
privileges,* such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or exports, act 
in a manner consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in 
this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders. 
 (b) The provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood to require 
that such enterprises shall, having due regard to the other provisions of this Agreement, make any 
such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations,* including price, 
quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale, and 
shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity, in accordance 
with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such purchases or sales. 
 (c) No contracting party shall prevent any enterprise (whether or not an enterprise 
described in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph) under its jurisdiction from acting in accordance 
with the principles of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph. 
The language of these three sub-paragraphs gives rise to a number of legal and practical questions, 
including with respect to the following matters: (i) the types of enterprises covered by the disciplines; 
and (ii) the substantive requirements of the general principles of non-discrimination.  
3.1.1 Covered enterprises  
Three distinct types of entities are covered by the terms of Article XVII:1: (i) "a State enterprise, 
wherever located" that is established or maintained by a Member ("State enterprise"); (ii) "any 
enterprise" that is granted "formally or in effect, exclusive or special privileges" ("privileged 
enterprise"); and (iii) "any enterprise", whether or not a "State enterprise" or "privileged enterprise". 
Under the terms of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVII:1, Members undertake to ensure that the 
                                                     
12
 London Preparatory Committee, EPCT/CII/PV5, p. 37. 
13
 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on Trade and Employment, Report to 
Commission A by Sub-Committee on Articles 31 and 32, 9 August 1947, EPCT/160, p. 8. It appears that one of the main 
reasons why this proposal was dropped is because the Soviet Union (at the time considered to be the only large trader that 
was likely to operate a complete monopoly of its import trade) did not participate in the meetings of the Preparatory 
Committee. See, Wilcox, C., A Charter for World Trade, The Macmillan Company, 1949, pp. 101-102; and Dam, K.W., 
The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization, Chicago University Press, 1970, p. 316.  
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operations of the first two types of enterprises are conducted in a manner consistent with the general 
principles of non-discrimination. Article XVII:1(c), on the other hand, imposes a negative obligation 
on Members not to prevent "any enterprise" from acting on a commercial basis. Whereas the nature of 
this third type of covered enterprise is self-explanatory, understanding what exactly amounts to a 
"State enterprise" or a "privileged enterprise" has proven to be more elusive.  
Although "State enterprises" were initially defined as enterprises over whose operations a 
government exercises effective control,
14
 this definition was deleted from the final version of Article 
XVII, with drafters ultimately viewing the language of sub-paragraph (a) to describe the kinds of 
enterprises that should be covered by the disciplines "as precisely as is practicable".
15
 In fact, it was 
recognized early on in the negotiations that State trading activities were varied and not very well 
understood and, consequently, that it would be best to avoid being overly prescriptive in describing the 
coverage of the relevant disciplines.
16
 There is, therefore, no definition of the types of enterprises 
falling within the scope of Article XVII, with the only specific guidance left by the original drafters set 
out in one of its Interpretative Notes, which clarifies that "marketing boards" will be subject to the 
disciplines of Article XVII:1 only when they engage in purchasing or selling activities (thereby 
leaving purely regulatory "marketing boards" outside of the reach of Article XVII:1).
17
  
The absence of a clear definition of State trading was raised a number of times during the history of 
the GATT 1947,
18
 but only directly addressed during the Uruguay Round,
19
 one of the key outcomes 
of which was the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII. The Understanding introduced 
the following "working definition" of STEs:  
Governmental or non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which have been 
granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional powers, in the 
exercise of which they influence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports 
or exports.
20
 
The "working definition" is explicitly stated to be without prejudice to the substantive provisions of 
Article XVII. A number of observations can be made about its content. First, it limits STEs to 
enterprises granted "exclusive or special rights or privileges". Commentators have argued that this is 
narrower than what is provided for under Article XVII because it excludes State enterprises that are 
not granted "exclusive or special privileges" from its scope of operation, a limitation that is not found 
in text of Article XVII:1(a).
21
 Second, the "working definition" confirms that "privileged enterprises" 
may include entities afforded the power to make purchases or sales by operation of national 
legislation or constitutional prerogatives. However, it does not otherwise explain what is meant by 
"exclusive or special rights or privileges". Third, the "working definition" envisages that covered 
enterprises will be those that "influence" international trade "through their purchases or sales", saying 
                                                     
14
 Report of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on International Trade 
and Employment, New York, 5 March 1947, EPCT/34, p. 28.  
15
 EPCT/160, Note 12, p. 6.  
16
 See, e.g., EPCT/CII.36, p. 11 (United States); ECPT/A/PV.15 pp. 15-23 (various); and EPCT/CII/37, pp. 1-4 (various). 
17
 Interpretative Notes Ad Article XVII:1. 
18
 See, e.g., discussion in Notifications of State-Trading Enterprises, Final Report adopted on 24 May 1960, 9th Supp. BISD 
179 ("1960 Notifications Panel Report"), p. 180 
19
 See, e.g., Article XVII (State Trading Enterprises), Note by the Secretariat, Negotiating Group on GATT Articles, 
MTN.GNG/NG7/W/15, 11 August 1987, paras. 13-17.  
20
 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII, para. 1. 
21
 See, e.g., Petersmann, E-U, GATT Law on State Trading Enterprises: Critical Evaluation of Article XVII and Proposals 
for Reform, pp. 71-96 at pp86-87, in Cottier, T. and Mavroidis, P. (eds), State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, 
University of Michigan Press, 1998.  
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nothing about whether any specific degree of "influence" would suffice for this purpose.
22
 
Nevertheless, by requiring that such influence result from "purchases or sales" activities, the "working 
definition" does reveal that the nature of the operations of a particular enterprise will be an important 
factor to consider when determining whether it falls within the scope of Article XVII. Moreover, the 
"working definition" does not explicitly tie the "purchases or sales" activities to imports or exports, 
suggesting that an enterprise need not actually import or export itself in order to be covered by Article 
XVII.
23
  
Another important result of the Uruguay Round was the establishment of the Working Party on 
State Trading Enterprises, which was tasked with inter alia developing an illustrative list of the kinds 
of relationships between governments and STEs, and the kinds of activities engaged in by such 
enterprises, for the purpose of Article XVII.
24
  
The Working Party's Illustrative List was produced in 1999 on the basis of information contained in 
STE notifications since 1980, and is intended to provide non-binding guidance only.
25
 It explains that 
a "notifiable state trading enterprise" has two essential features: (i) first, it must have "a relationship to 
government through the latter's granting of a right or privilege"; and (ii) second, it must conduct "an 
activity which influences the level or direction of imports and exports".
26
 In terms of relationships 
between notifiable entities and government, a broad spectrum of different associations are presented, 
ranging from entities that are branches of government, government-owned or partially government-
owned, to entities that are entirely separate from the government but established and maintained under 
legislation and financed and controlled by the producers of the product over which they may have 
marketing authority.
27
 As regards the types of activities engaged in by notifiable enterprises, the 
Illustrative List sets out a non-exhaustive list of at least 17 operations considered to be of a kind 
"which might be engaged in by a state trading enterprise", emphasizing that "no one activity or 
combination of activities necessarily identifies an enterprise as falling within the agreed WTO 
definitions of 'state trading enterprise'".
28
 It is apparent from the broad, non-exhaustive and non-
binding nature of the guidance set out in the Illustrative List that Members have continued to shy away 
from developing a comprehensive definition of STEs, preferring the flexibility that comes with the 
existing broadly-worded text of Article XVII and the "working definition" – an observation that is 
arguably supported by the fact that the definitional issue has never been raised in GATT or WTO 
dispute settlement.  
3.1.2 Substantive requirements  
3.1.2.1 Most-favoured-nation and national treatment obligations? 
One of the recurring questions concerning the interpretation of Article XVII:1 is whether the 
obligation to conduct purchases or sales operations involving either imports or exports "in a manner 
consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment in the {GATT} for 
governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders" extends beyond a requirement 
                                                     
22
 According to Davey, this omission represents a possible element of vagueness in the definition. Davey, W., Article XVII 
GATT: An Overview, p. 25 in Cottier, T. and Mavroidis, P. (eds), State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, University 
of Michigan Press, 1998.  
23
 The same clarification was made in the 1960 Notifications Panel Report. 
24
 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII, para. 5. 
25
 Illustrative List, para. 2. 
26
 Illustrative List, para. 6. 
27
 Illustrative List, para. 8. 
28
 Illustrative List, para. 9 (emphasis added). 
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of most-favoured-nation treatment and includes a national treatment obligation.
29
 While the national 
treatment rule specified in Article III would obviously catch any action on the part of an STE taking 
the form of the types of governmental measures falling within its scope of operation (namely, taxes 
and other internal charges, laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal marketing and sale 
of imported products), an STE's "purchases or sales" operations may not always be covered.
30
  
The negotiating history suggests that the principle of non-discrimination that is enshrined in Article 
XVII:1 was not intended to include a national treatment obligation. In the United States' original 
proposal, the notion of non-discrimination was described in terms of "non-discriminatory treatment" 
"compared with the treatment accorded to the commerce of any country other than that in which the 
enterprise is located".
31
 A subsequent draft of the negotiating text was even clearer in this regard, 
specifying that the "commerce of other Members shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to the commerce of any country, other than that in which the enterprise is located".
32
  
1.1.  This understanding of the negotiating history is reflected in the report of the GATT Panel in the 
1952 Belgian Family Allowances case, where the panel found that the non-discrimination obligation in 
Article XVII:1 "did not extend to matters dealt with in Article III".
33
 However, in subsequent 
disputes,
34
 GATT Panels have taken a more cautious approach, never fully entering into the merits of 
claims grounded in the existence of a national treatment obligation in Article XVII after making 
findings of inconsistency of the challenged measures with other provisions of the GATT. Nevertheless, 
in the obiter dictum of one of these disputes, the 1984 Canada – FIRA case, the GATT Panel "saw 
great force in Canada's argument that only the most-favoured-nation and not the national treatment 
obligations fall within the scope of the general principles referred to in Article XVII:1(a)."
35
 
In order to clarify the situation, the United States submitted a proposal during the Uruguay Round 
calling for an explicit recognition that "the national treatment obligation or Article III applies to state 
trading".
36
 However, there was little appetite among the participants to negotiate such substantive 
matters. Nevertheless, soon after the establishment of the WTO, the question was once again brought 
before a panel in the Korea – Various Measures on Beef dispute. In this proceeding, Australia 
challenged certain beef tendering practices of a Korean STE, which Australia claimed inter alia 
afforded less favourable treatment to imported beef compared to domestic beef in violation of Article 
XVII:1.
37
 Not unlike the GATT-era panels, the WTO panel in Korea – Various Measures on Beef 
chose not to make any specific finding on the merits of Australia's Article XVII:1 (national treatment) 
                                                     
29
 See, e.g., Davey, pp. 17-33. 
30
 Cf Roessler, who argues that the "national treatment provisions of Articles III:2 and III:4 … are sufficiently broadly 
worded to capture the denial of national treatment to imported products through state trading operations". Roessler, F., 
Comment: Canada – Wheat: discrimination, non-commercial considerations, and the right to regulate through state 
trading enterprises, (2008) 7 World Trade Review 1, pp. 67-69 at p. 69. 
31
 United States Suggested Charter, Article 26. 
32
 First Session of the Preparatory Committee held in London in 1946. London Report, First Session of the Preparatory 
Committee, EPCT/33 ("London Report"), p. 32. 
33
 GATT Panel Report, Belgian Family Allowances, G/32, adopted 7 November 1952, BISD 1S/59 at p. 60 para. 4.  
34
 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, L/5504, adopted on 7 February 
1984, BISD 30S/140 ("Canada – FIRA"); GATT Panel Report, Canada – Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic 
Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies, L/6304, adopted on 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/37; and GATT Panel 
Report, Canada – Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies, 
adopted on 18 February 1992, DS17/R, BISD 39S/27. 
35
 GATT Panel Report, Canada – FIRA, p. 163, para. 5.16. 
36
 State Trading: Proposal by the United States, MTN.GNG/NG7/W/55, 13 October 1989, at p. 2. 
37
 Panel Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 770. 
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claim, ruling instead in favour of Australia with respect to the same measures on the basis of claims 
made under Articles II and XI of the GATT.
38
 
Thus, despite having multiple opportunities to rule upon complaints premised on the view that 
Article XVII:1 imposes a national treatment obligation on the purchases or sales operations of STEs, 
both GATT-era and WTO panels have avoided making any findings on the question, saying very little, 
if anything, about the matter. Because complaints have always been pursued in relation to STE 
measures or conduct impugned under other GATT provisions, it has to date never been necessary for a 
panel to fully explore and resolve an Article XVII:1 national treatment claim. While this means that 
the Article XVII:1 national treatment question remains unsettled, any gap in the disciplines applicable 
to STEs that might be caused by this uncertainty has, thus far, not adversely affected the interests of 
complaining Members, given that the practices challenged under Article XVII:1 in all of the relevant 
disputes were, ultimately, found to be inconsistent with other GATT provisions.  
3.1.2.2 Do sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVII impose distinct obligations? 
Article XVII:1(b) clarifies that the obligation in Article XVII:1(a) to make purchases or sales 
involving imports or exports in a manner consistent with the principle of non-discrimination "shall be 
understood to require" STEs to "make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with 
commercial considerations" and "afford the enterprises of other contracting parties adequate 
opportunity, in accordance with customary business practices, to compete for such purchases or sales". 
The relationship between these two sub-paragraphs and, in particular, the extent to which they 
prescribe distinct legal obligations was one of the main questions that arose in the Canada – Wheat 
Board case, the only WTO dispute to have thus far resulted in both panel and Appellate Body findings 
with respect to the operation of Article XVII. 
In this dispute, the United States challenged the export operations of the Canadian Wheat Board 
("CWB"), arguing that they failed to respect the standards of non-discrimination set out in Article 
XVII:1 because they involved the use of the CWB's exclusive and special privileges to shut out 
competitors from making sales in particular export markets.
39
 In advancing this line of argument, the 
United States submitted that sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVII:1 imposed three distinct legal 
obligations on STEs: (i) to act in a manner consistent with the principles of non-discrimination (sub-
paragraph (a)); (ii) to make purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations 
(sub-paragraph (b), first clause); and (iii) to afford the enterprises of all Members adequate 
opportunity to compete for participation in CWB's sales (sub-paragraph (b), second clause).
40
  
The panel did not take a position on the merits of the United States' legal interpretation, rejecting 
the United States' claim on other grounds.
41
 However, on appeal, the Appellate Body examined the 
United States' arguments more closely, finding that they could not be sustained. According to the 
Appellate Body, it was "abundantly clear" from the language of sub-paragraph (b) that the entirety of 
sub-paragraph (b) is "dependent upon the content of subparagraph (a), and operates to clarify the scope 
of the requirement not to discriminate in subparagraph (a)".
42
 Thus, while ruling out the possibility 
that a violation of Article XVII:1 could be established solely on the basis of a failure to satisfy one of 
the two requirements set out in Article XVII:1(b), the Appellate Body also effectively ruled that sub-
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paragraph (b) will become relevant only when the governmental action at issue is of a kind that should 
be governed by the principles of non-discrimination prescribed in sub-paragraph (a).
43
 
3.1.2.3 The meaning of "commercial considerations" 
The requirement in Article XVII:1(b) that STEs must make their "purchases or sales solely in 
accordance with commercial considerations, including price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation and other conditions or purchase or sale" is clarified in two Interpretative Notes, the 
first of which reads as follows: 
The charging by a state enterprise of different prices for its sales of a product in different markets 
is not precluded by the provisions of this Article, provided that such different prices are charged 
for commercial reasons, to meet conditions of supply and demand in export markets.
44
 
In exploring the United States' Article XVII:1 claims in Canada – Wheat Exports, the panel found that 
the clarification set out in this Interpretative Note implies that an export STE would not be acting 
inconsistently with the non-discrimination obligation in Article XVII:1(a), if it were to charge 
different prices for sales of the same products in different export markets, provided that those prices 
were charged for commercial reasons.
45
 However, the United States' claims against the CWB's export 
operations were based on a different understanding of the obligation to act in accordance with 
"commercial considerations". In particular, the United States argued that the obligation to act solely in 
accordance with "commercial considerations" means that an STE's trading activities must be 
conducted in the same way as a commercial actor – that is, an economic entity that maximizes profits, 
does not enjoy government-conferred privileges or exclusive rights, and is disciplined by market 
forces.
46
 
The panel found nothing in the text of Article XVII:1(b) to support the United States' position. For 
the panel, the requirement that STEs act solely in accordance with commercial considerations simply 
means that they should seek to purchase or sell on the basis of "considerations pertaining to commerce 
and trade, or considerations which involve regarding purchases or sales 'as mere matters of 
business'".
47
 Accordingly, the panel rejected the United States' argument that the first clause of sub-
paragraph (b) should be interpreted so as to prohibit an export STE from using its exclusive or special 
privileges to gain a competitive advantage over competing "commercial actors", finding that the only 
constraint imposed on the use of exclusive or special privileges is that they be used to make sales 
which are driven exclusively by "commercial considerations".
48
  
The panel's findings were upheld on appeal, with the Appellate Body adding that it saw no basis for 
interpreting the disciplines in Article XVII, which are aimed at preventing certain types of 
discrimination, "as imposing comprehensive competition-law-type obligations on STEs".
49
 According 
to the Appellate Body, the requirement to act solely in accordance with "commercial considerations" 
does not require STEs to refrain from using their privileges and advantages simply because such use 
might "disadvantage" private enterprises. STEs are entitled to exploit the advantages they may enjoy 
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to their economic benefit, just like private enterprises.
50
 Thus, the Appellate Body "saw force" in the 
panel's rejection of the United States "purposive interpretation", which attributed a very broad scope to 
Article XVII:1 without accounting for the disciplines on the operations of STEs found in other 
covered agreements, such as the SCM Agreement, Article VI of the GATT, the Anti-dumping 
Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture.
51
 
3.1.2.4 Affording an adequate opportunity to compete in purchases or sales 
The second clause of Article XVII:1(b) requires that STEs afford the "enterprises" of other Members 
"adequate opportunity, in accordance with customary business practice, to compete for participation in 
{their} purchases or sales".  
In Canada – Wheat Exports, the United States argued that this requirement imposed an obligation 
on the CWB to ensure that, in its export sales, any enterprise wanting to compete for participation as a 
potential wheat-buyer or as a wheat-selling producer, should be afforded an adequate opportunity to 
compete for those sales.
52
 The United States submissions were rejected by both the panel
53
 and on 
appeal, with the Appellate Body ultimately explaining that the requirement to afford an adequate 
opportunity to compete for participation in such sales refers to the opportunity to become the STE's 
counterpart in the sales transaction itself, not to an opportunity to replace the STE as a participant in 
the transaction.
54
 
3.2 Preservation of negotiated market access concessions 
Rules governing certain aspects of the operation of import monopolies are set out in Article II:4 GATT, 
which provides as follows: 
4. If any contracting party establishes, maintains or authorizes, formally or in effect, a monopoly 
of the importation of any product described in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, 
such monopoly shall not, except as provided for in that Schedule or as otherwise agreed between 
the parties which initially negotiated the concession, operate so as to afford protection on the 
average in excess of the amount of protection provided for in that Schedule. The provisions of this 
paragraph shall not limit the use by contracting parties of any form of assistance to domestic 
producers permitted by other provisions of this Agreement.* 
Although there is no reference to "State trading enterprises" in Article II:4, it is generally recognized 
that this provision imposes disciplines on the mark-up practices of one particular kind of STE – an 
import monopoly. The basic rationale for the introduction of rules to moderate the pricing practices of 
import monopolies is that, left to their own devices, monopoly operators could potentially circumvent 
negotiated concessions by applying mark-ups on imported products sold on the domestic market at 
levels that would price them above domestically produced competing products. It would, therefore, be 
relatively easy for a monopoly importer to undermine the anticipated benefits of market access 
commitments by trading in a way that directly or indirectly resulted in raising the price of imported 
products to prohibitive or non-competitive levels.  
Article II:4 endeavours to prevent this potential form of circumvention by requiring Members 
maintaining or authorizing an import monopoly to ensure that it is not operated so as to afford greater 
protection to a particular product than provided for in that Member's Schedule of concessions or as 
otherwise agreed between the parties that negotiated the concessions. Thus, absent a special agreement 
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between negotiating parties, the tariff bindings inscribed into a Member's Schedule of concessions will 
serve to define the level of protection that may be afforded to domestic producers through an import 
monopoly. In this respect, Article II:4 specifically provides that the degree of protection cannot "on 
average" exceed "the amount of protection provided for" in the relevant Member's Schedule.  
Article II:4 is yet to be explored in WTO dispute settlement practice. However, it has been 
interpreted and applied in a number of GATT cases, which have laid down guidance for how to 
calculate the maximum prices and mark-ups that an import monopoly will be entitled to charge.  
In terms of prices, the panel in Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC) found that an import 
monopoly must charge a price that does not exceed the landed cost of the imported product plus 
customs duties, transportation, distribution and other expenses incidental to its purchase, sale or 
further processing, as well as a reasonable margin of profit and any internal taxes.
55
 The same panel 
also found that differential mark-ups on the internal sale of imported and domestic products could be 
levied by an import monopoly, provided that they reflect specific costs associated with the purchase or 
sale of the domestic or imported products.
56
 Likewise, the panel in Canada – Provincial Liquor 
Boards (US) reached essentially the same conclusion, explaining that a differential mark-up should 
allow for the recovery of: (i) costs directly associated with the handling of the imported product; (ii) 
charges for fixed assets in proportion to the use of those assets by the imported product; and (iii) all 
other general and administrative expenses allocated uniformly to all domestic and imported products.
57
 
Finally, when it comes to profit margins, the panel in Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC) 
considered that monopoly importers are not entitled to earn monopoly profit, as this "could not 
normally be considered as a 'reasonable margin of profit' in the sense of Article II:4, especially if it 
were higher on imported products than domestic products."
58
 
3.3 Import and export restrictions made effective through STEs 
Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII of the GATT set out the main rules applicable to the 
maintenance of quantitative import and export restrictions. A general prohibition on the application of 
quantitative restrictions is prescribed in Article XI:1, with Articles XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII 
describing when and the extent to which this obligation may be derogated from for balance of 
payments and economic development reasons. The Interpretative Note to these provisions reads: 
Throughout Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII, the terms "import restrictions" or "export 
restrictions" include restrictions made effective through State trading operations. 
The GATT, thus, recognizes that quantitative restrictions may be effected through not only direct 
government action, but also the purchases or sales activities of STEs. The most obvious way that an 
STE might be operated with this effect would be if an import monopoly were directed to make no or 
only limited purchases of imports. Such a factual scenario arose in Japan – Agricultural Products, 
where import restrictions imposed by a Japanese STE on certain agricultural products were found to 
be inconsistent with Article XI:1 on the basis of the Interpretative Note.
59
 
The same Interpretative Note has also been relied upon to successfully challenge the distribution 
activities of STEs possessing both monopoly import and distribution privileges. In Canada – 
Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), the distribution practices of the Canadian STEs which discriminated 
between imported and domestic products (by, e.g., limiting the points of sale of imported products 
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relative to domestic products) were found to be inconsistent with Article XI:1 because, in the light of 
the existing monopoly over imports and distribution, they effectively operated as restrictions on 
imports, within the meaning of the Interpretative Note.
60
 Essentially the same line of reasoning was 
relied upon by the WTO panel in Korea – Various Measures on Beef, where the distribution practices 
of a Korean STE exercising exclusive importation and distribution rights over 30% of Korea's beef 
imports were found to amount to restrictions on beef imports inconsistent with Article XI:1.
61
  
3.4 The 1954-55 GATT Review Session 
The rules and disciplines on State trading contained in the original GATT 1947 were narrower in both 
scope and ambition compared to those set out in the Havana Charter of 1948. However, after it 
became apparent that the Havana Charter would not enter into force, the GATT contracting parties 
during the 1954-1955 GATT Review Session explored the possibility of amending the GATT 1947 to 
capture what had already been agreed and incorporated into the Havana Charter. It was decided that 
two new paragraphs would be inserted to: (i) create a role for mutually advantageous negotiations to 
address the adverse trade effects of State trading enterprises which might not be regulated by other 
existing disciplines; and (ii) introduce certain transparency requirements.
62
  
3.4.1 Negotiations to limit or remove obstacles to trade 
Article XVII:3 provides that: 
The contracting parties recognize that enterprises of the kind described in paragraph 1(a) of this 
Article might be operated so as to create serious obstacles to trade; thus negotiations on a 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis designed to limit or reduce such obstacles are of 
importance to international trade.* 
Article XVII:3 envisages that negotiations may be undertaken with a view to limiting or reducing the 
obstacles created by STEs in the same way as tariff negotiations are used to secure market access.
63
 
The Interpretative Note to this paragraph clarifies that such negotiations "may be directed towards the 
reduction of duties and other charges on imports or exports, or towards the conclusion of any other 
mutually satisfactory arrangement" consistent with the GATT. To the extent that it encourages 
Members to enter into negotiations with a view to addressing the potential adverse trade effects of 
STE operations on negotiated market access concessions, Article XVII:3 broadly reflects the second of 
the three main objectives pursued by the United States' original proposals
64
 which had evolved into 
Article 31:1 and 31:2 of the Havana Charter.  
However, in practice, arrangements of the kind envisaged under Article XVII:3 appear to have 
most often been negotiated in the context of the accession to the GATT/WTO of countries considered 
to have non-market economies.
65
 Thus, for example, minimum import purchase commitments were 
negotiated in the accession protocols of Poland (1967) and Romania (1971), with GATT Contracting 
Parties furthermore preserving a right to maintain their own import quotas on Polish and Romanian 
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exports.
66
 The latter arrangement was also agreed with Hungary when it acceded to the GATT in 
1974.
67
 
A somewhat broader range of commitments affecting the operations of STEs have been negotiated 
with more recently acceding Members of the WTO. Thus, for example, on joining the WTO, China 
undertook obligations in relation to trading rights and the liberalization of State trading monopolies in 
a number of sectors. In particular, China agreed to progressively liberalize the availability and scope 
of the right to trade, so that, within three years after accession all enterprises in China would have the 
right to trade in all goods, with the exception of those identified in one of the annexes to its Accession 
Protocol, which could continue to remain subject to State trading.
68
 China accepted that it would phase 
out import quotas and import licensing requirements with respect to 377 products, some of which were 
traded through State trading enterprises.
69
 Moreover, China agreed to progressively abolish State 
trading in respect of silk;
70
 that imports allocated to non-State traders of crude and processed oil would 
be carried over to the next year if they were not fully utilized;
71
 and that it would ensure that no price 
increase imposed by State trading enterprises would result in protection beyond that allowed in its 
Schedule of Concessions.
72
 China also confirmed that it would ensure that all State-owned and State-
invested enterprises would make purchases and sales based solely on commercial considerations, and 
that the enterprises of other WTO Members would have an adequate opportunity to compete for sales 
to and purchases from these enterprises on non-discriminatory terms and conditions. In addition, 
China undertook not to influence, directly or indirectly, commercial decisions on the part of State-
owned or State-invested enterprises, including on the quantity, value or country of origin of any goods 
purchased or sold.
73
  
3.5 Transparency 
With little known about the nature and full extent of State trading at the time of the GATT/ITO 
negotiations,
74
 it was apparent that provisions would be needed to ensure adequate disclosure of 
information about the operations of STEs in order to secure the proper functioning of the adopted 
disciplines. Paragraph 4 to Article XVII was introduced for this purpose, partly reflecting Article 31:3 
and 31:4 of the Havana Charter.
75
  
Article XVII:4 has four sub-paragraphs. Sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) require Members to notify the 
products that are the subject of an STE's import or export operations, and to furnish "information 
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about its operations" if considered by another Member to be adversely effecting its trading interests. 
Together, these provisions establish the legal basis for the core transparency and notification 
requirements in relation to STEs. The opportunity for Members to make "counter-notifications" where 
it is felt that another Member's notification is incomplete, incorrect or where no notification has been 
made, was introduced in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII.
76
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Article XVII and related provisions of the GATT were originally introduced in an effort to ensure that 
the activities of STEs were conducted on terms and conditions approximating those of private traders 
and without negating the market access benefits achieved through the operation of other GATT 
disciplines. As State trading was a relatively new and unknown realm of international trade, drafters 
considered that agreement on a general set of rules and principles aimed at achieving this goal would 
suffice, anticipating that the negotiated outcomes would be fine-tuned and modified as necessary 
through their implementation.  
In the 70 years since their adoption, developments in both the GATT 1947 and the WTO have 
delineated a set of seldom used and relatively limited disciplines rooted in the principle of non-
discrimination. When considered in the light of the fact that the GATT was never expected to 
comprehensively regulate the activities of STEs in a way that would eliminate all of the potential 
obstacles to international trade they might cause,
77
 this is not a surprising outcome. Indeed, the fact 
that a separate and additional set of disciplines on the "business practices affecting international 
trade" of "public commercial enterprises" was included in the Havana Charter,
78
 would appear to 
confirm that Article XVII and related provisions of the GATT were not intended to regulate all 
manifestations of a State's participation as a trader in international commerce.  
With the last formal dispute settlement complaint brought against an STE over 14 years ago,
79
 and 
the continued resort to the inclusion of "WTO-plus" commitments in the protocols of accession of new 
WTO Members, doubts may well be raised about whether Members perceive the existing GATT 
disciplines as an effective tool to address the types of "State trading" activities undertaken today. The 
fact remains, however, that while STEs continue to operate across the world, and fundamental 
questions about the full reach and scope of the existing rules endure, it cannot be excluded that the 
limits of Articles XVII and related provisions of the GATT may be explored in the future practice of 
WTO Members, thereby clarifying their regulatory function in the modern trading system. 
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